Transnational Diffusion of Ideas and Technologies by Peterson, M.J.
 
This was created by the International Dimensions of Ethics Education in Science and Engineering (IDEESE) Project at the 
University of Massachusetts Amherst with support from the National Science Foundation under grant number 0734887. Any 
opinions, findings, conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily 
reflect the views of the National Science Foundation. More information about the IDEESE can be found at 
http://www.umass.edu/sts/ethics.  
 
This should be cited as: M.J. Peterson. 2008. “Transnational Diffusion of Ideas and Technologies.”  International Dimensions of 
Ethics Education in Science and Engineering. Available www.umass.edu/sts/ethics. 
 
 © 2008 IDEESE Project 
 
Transnational Diffusion of Ideas and Technologies 
MJ Peterson 
 
International Dimensions of Ethics Education in Science and Engineering 
Background Reading 
Version 1; August 2008 
 
 
Diffusion of New Ideas, Practices, and Technological Innovations 
 
I.  The Basic Model of Diffusion 
 
Most historians of ideas and technological change agree that the spread of ideas, practices, or innovations 
from the originators to others can be described by a hazard model.  Hazard models, first developed in 
epidemiology and now used in many fields of social science, are mathematical formulations used to predict 
the likelihood that an individual will actually experience an event (such as developing a disease) within a 
particular time period given some risk (probability) that the event will happen to her or him.  Whatever the 
level of risk of developing the particular disease, its cumulative spread through the population can be 
summarized with an S-curve plotted by placing time along the x axis and the number of new cases 
occurring in each time interval along the y axis.  At first the disease spreads slowly because there are few 
sources of infection that trigger uninfected individuals in the process of exposure to germs, their incubation, 
and their overwhelming of immune system that culminates in disease.  Even if the disease has a 75% 
transmission rate (three-fourths of those exposed to the germs causing to develop the disease 
themselves), each individual is unlikely to encounter someone who is contagious.  Thus, the number of new 
cases increases slowly.  As more people come down with the disease, however, a threshold is reached at 
which each individual’s likelihood of encountering a source of infection increases significantly.  In this 
second phase, indicated by the steeply rising portion of the S-curve, spread of the disease speeds up and 
the number of new cases per time interval increases exponentially.  Spread enters a third phase once most 
people have been exposed to the disease, indicated by the slowly rising (or even flat) upper portion of the 
S-curve.  With most people already exposed to the disease and only a few left who have not encountered 
it, the number of new cases per time interval drops.  While the exact shape of the S-curve depends on the 
rate of transmission of the disease and the period of time needed for it to incubate in a newly-exposed 
person, the basic shape holds true for the spread of any disease that is not inhibited by effective preventive 
measures. 
 
Studies of the diffusion of ideas, practices, and technological innovations substitute them for the germs of 
the disease model, and treat learning about their existence and content as the equivalent of exposure to a 
source of infection.  Similarly, the rate of adoption of the new idea, practice, or technological innovation is 
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the parallel to the transmission rate of a disease, and the amount of time between learning about the idea, 
practice, or technology and deciding to whether adopt it is the parallel to the incubation period for a 
disease.  Some analysts of innovation argue that the upward inflection point separating the first phase from 
the second occurs when somewhere between 10 and 25% of the population had adopted the new 
technology because that is when interpersonal “word of mouth” communication about it accelerates.1  Yet, 
this is a wide interval and not particularly helpful for making predictions.  In addition, many ideas, practices, 
technological innovations never diffuse beyond the circle of inventors and innovators.  Others may diffuse a 
bit further, but never to the point where the S-curve moves from slow to exponential rise; for a variety of 
reasons most people decide against adopting them and using them. 
 
Quantifying the adoption rate and the time between initial learning and the adopt/reject decision is harder 
than quantifying the transmission rate and incubation period of a disease.  These obstacles to easy 
quantification mean that S-curve graphs work better for tracing past patterns of spread than for predicting 
future ones.  Even so, the hazard model is a useful heuristic device because it alerts us to recurrent 
patterns and sensitizes us to the need for paying attention to phase transitions.  In particular, it warns 
enthusiastic proselytizers of ideas or sellers of new technologies that explosive growth in the number of 
converts or buyers will not last forever. 
 
 
An S-curve (hypothetical data) 
 
 
The elements of the hazard model also direct attention to questions of what influences the likelihood that 
people will first learn about a new idea or technological advance and then choose to adopt it.  Prior learning 
is necessary to (though not sufficient for) adoption, so anything that reduces the likelihood of learning about 
an idea, practice or technology (such as expression in an unfamiliar language, garbled messages in a 
familiar language, or censorship) or blocks access to a device or object embodying a technological 
                                                     
1 E.g., Everett Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations (3rd edition.  New York; Free Press, 1983), p.11. 
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innovation for trial use (such as distance from the makers, high cost of the device or object, or regulations 
limiting access to the device or object) automatically inhibits adoption. 
 
Just as diseases spread from some initial source of infection to persons nearby, and then from them to a 
wider set of others, and so on, new ideas, practices and technologies originate with some individual or 
small group and then spread to successively larger circles of others.  Diseases can make long geographic 
leaps if carried from one part of the world to another by infected travelers; learning about ideas, practices, 
and technologies can also span long distances through telecommunications and geographically dispersed 
social, professional, or business networks. 
 
Yet, it is important to remember that learning about the new idea, practice, or technology does not 
automatically lead to its adoption.  Amish communities are quite familiar with motor vehicles and 
telephones, but have chosen to restrict their use to a few very particular occasions and do not keep them 
within individual households.  Japanese warriors became familiar with and used firearms in the early 17th 
century, but made and maintained a collective decision to avoid their use during Japan’s era of isolation 
under the Tokugawa Shoguns between 1630 and 1854. 
 
Both examples point up the importance of users’ own evaluation of new ideas and technologies.  Unlike 
germs, which are unwanted but can get past all of a person’s hygienic precautions and immune system 
defenses, adoption requires willing acceptance.  Analysis of the diffusion of technology typically distinguish 
among: 
 
1.) “inventors” who come up with the initial version of the new technology; 
 
2.) “innovators” who modify the initial version in ways that make the technology more attractive to 
potential users by increasing its reliability, simplifying the process of making it, or simplifying its 
use; 
 
3.) “early adopters” who start using the new technology soon after it appears; 
 
4.) “adopters” (sometimes divided into “early majority” and “late majority”) who take it up after 
seeing a number of others use it; 
 
5.) “late adopters” who take it up only after the vast majority of others have; and 
 
6.) “nonadopters” who never use it although they know that it exists and that other people in their 
area are using it.  
 
An individual or organization considering the adoption of a new idea, practice, or technology needs to be 
convinced that adoption will improve its overall situation.  Sometimes the individual or organization 
considers its own situation in isolation from what others are doing.  Such a focus clearly shaped the choice 
of the apocryphal Vermont farmer whose phone rings while a neighbor is visiting.  The neighbor asks if he 
is going to answer it, and the farmer says “Nope; I put that thing in for my convenience.”  More often, 
however, the fact others are using a particular idea, practice, or technology strongly influences the decision.  
This is particularly true in competitive situations – such as prevail between armies, business firms, or sports 
teams – where any new idea, practice or technology that gives its users any advantage must either be 
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adopted or understood well enough to develop effective defenses against it.  Others’ use also affects 
decisions about whether and when to adopt any technology with “network effects” – increasing value to 
users as larger number of others also adopt it. 
 
Studies of diffusion have identified several factors that affect the rate of adoption of a new technology in a 
single country or community: 
 
 1.) Characteristics of the technology itself or in comparison to competing technologies; 
 
 2.) Economic benefit/cost ratio of using the new technology; 
 
 3.) Mode of social decision about adopting new technologies; 
 
 4.) Communication channels used to promote the new technology; 
 
 5.) Social and material conditions in which the technology will be used; and 
 
 6.) Extent of promotion by trusted persons;2 
 
Characteristics of the technology include its own features, its functionality as compared to other 
technologies for accomplishing the same task, and its feasibility within current technological attainments.  
The important features of the technology itself include ease and convenience of use, compatibility with 
technologies already in use, fit with prevailing social expectations, and the extent to which users can try it 
out temporarily or on a small scale before having to commit to adoption or non-adoption.  Cost and ease of 
use as compared with other technologies is also important, though users will accept a short period of 
inconvenience as they master the new device if they believe gains in convenience or effectiveness will 
repay that effort.  Feasibility within the limits of current technological attainments determines whether the 
idea for the technology gets expressed in a physical device.  Many inventors get good ideas before 
fabrication technologies are well enough developed to permit making devices based on them.  Sir George 
Cayley, a prosperous landowner in Yorkshire, England worked out the basic design for airplanes – a wing 
to get lift from moving air, a propulsion device to get the moving air by moving the wing through it, and tail 
rudders for steering – in 1809.  However, his design was not realized until 1903 when internal combustion 
engines proved capable of supplying the right combination of sufficiently lightweight and strong power.3  
Sometimes the state of complementary or related technologies – technologies that need to be used 
together with the new invention for it to work well – are insufficient.  A working fax machine was exhibited at 
the Crystal Palace Exposition of 1851, but it was not until the transmission speed of phone lines got up 
above 3000 bits/second in the 1970s that fax connections convenient and affordable for users in small 
offices or stores became available.  
 
Cost-benefit ratios of use also influences adoption rates.  Though high cost directly limits adoption, most 
economic calculations affecting acquisition involve comparison with the cost of other ways of doing the 
                                                     
2 Everett Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations (3rd edition.  New York; Free Press, 1983). 
 
3J.A. Bagley, “Aeronautics” in Ian McNeil, editor, An Encyclopedia of the History of Technology  (London: Routledge, 1990), 619-
624. 
 
Transnational Diffusion of Ideas and Technology 
 
 
  5
same task.  High cost did help confine telephones to upper and upper middle class homes in Europe and 
North America in the 1920s.  In Sweden households within 1 kilometer of a large telephone exchange were 
more likely to have phones than others because the more distant households had to pay the National 
Telecommunications Administration the cost of running wires to their houses before service would be 
installed.4  This initial cost dampened their enthusiasm considerably.  Yet, relative benefits-cost ratios are 
typically more important.  Many businesses that might have opted for telephones found that by careful 
phrasing or use of any of the many published abbreviation systems (“commercial codes”) available, 
telegrams were cheaper than telephone calls for urgent long distance business communications until well 
into the 20th century.  City dwellers in the 1920s found it cheaper to garage and run a modest-price 
automobile than to house, feed, and equip a horse. 
 
The mode of decision-making used to select new technologies also affect the rate and extent of adoption.  
Societies in which individual persons, households, or firms are allowed to choose on their own have 
different diffusion patterns than those where the adoption process involves collective decisions among all 
members of an extended social group or decision for a large group by a small leadership.  In the collective 
decision situation, individual limited trials may occur, but general use develops only after a social 
consensus in favor.  Until that consensus emerges, the graph of adoptions over time will be flat and close 
to 0 on the y-axis.  Afterward, the rate of adoption will rise, but how steeply depends on whether the 
consensus is a decision that everyone most adopts the technology or a decision permitting adopters to go 
ahead and nonadopters to persist in their choice.  Similar patterns mark centralized decision, though in this 
situation trials are controlled by the leadership and debate about whether to adopt is confined to a few.    
Even where decisions are made individually or by local communities, government regulations and taxes 
can encourage or hinder adoption of new technologies.  Many governments promoted aviation in the 1920s 
and 1930s through subsidies.  The contemporary US dependence on motor vehicles can be traced partly to 
policies favoring road and highway construction; conversely, high fuel taxes helped constrain household 
possession of automobiles in Western Europe. 
 
Two communication channels, mass media and person-to-person contact can spread ideas about new 
technologies.  Mass media are most effective for disseminating information that a new technology has been 
incorporated into devices very quickly, person-to-person communication between users and non-users 
among their family, friends, or occupational networks have the most impact on adoption decisions. 
 
Social and material conditions also affect diffusion.  Political and social stability encourages longer-term 
projects by promoting confidence that they can be finished and their results enjoyed.  Technologies may 
intertwine with social factors that encourage or inhibit use.  In the 1960s and 1970s fax technology was 
more popular in Japan than telex.  Telex is a character-based system, an automated telegram system in 
which the sender types characters on a keyboard and the machine converts them into the Morse dot-and-
dash code used on the wire and the receiving machine converts the Morse code back into characters and 
prints them out on paper while fax technology reveals characters as output of line-by-line scanning of light 
and dark areas.  Japanese users liked fax because it is much easier to scan than to type out the 4000 
characters of Chinese ideograph-based kanji and additional syllabic characters of kana script used in 
written Japanese.  Desire to “keep up” with the neighbors means that households in neighborhoods where 
most others have acquired a particular new device – say a color television in the 1960s – will be more likely 
                                                     
4 Torsten Hagerstrand, Innovation Diffusion as a Spatial Process (Allan Paul, trans.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1967), 53. 
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to buy one than households in neighborhoods where few others have them.  Adoption of technologies 
incorporated into obviously expensive devices may be hindered by social beliefs that possession inspires 
envy and the envious respond by invoking witchcraft against the envied person.5  Studies of farmers’ 
adoption of new irrigation technologies have shown that soil quality and depth of the water table are major 
determinants of farmers’ choices regarding irrigation.6 
 
Individuals trusted by others in the community can foster or hinder adoption of a new technology.  In every 
community others look to certain people for guidance because of some role they occupy or a reputation for 
wisdom.  In many countries farmers’ technology choices are strongly influenced by what government-
employed agricultural agents recommend or warn against in the course of their work.  The Nestlé campaign 
to promote use of baby formula in developing countries succeeded as well as it did (and attracted as much 
vehement objection as it did) because the women hired to promote it often dressed in a manner similar to 
medical clinic staff.  
 
The existence of so many influences on technology choice mean that the route from learning about a 
technology to using it regularly is more complex than the route from encountering germs to coming down 
with a disease.  Unlike the pathway from germs to disease, the pathway from learning about a technology 
to using it regularly involves physical, social, and individual factors.  Yet, the hazard model does capture 
broad patterns.  The answer to the puzzle about how something influenced by many factors can be 
expressed in similar patterns has two parts: a) the pattern has considerable variation in the timing and 
speed of its phases and b) innovators and other advocates of a technology pay attention to potential users’ 
reactions and often modify the devices embodying the technology or their explanations of what the 
technology can do to fit their audience.  It is frequently the case that the early devices using a particular 
technology bear little resemblance to the later ones; the vacuum tubes and mechanical card readers of the 
Univacs of the 1950s bear scant resemblance to the silicon chips and magnetic hard drives of 
contemporary computers. 
 
II. The Impact of National Differences on Diffusion 
 
The simplest hazard models assume an undifferentiated population in which each individual has about the 
same likelihood of encountering any other nearby individual and influences pass freely between them.  
More sophisticated ones are able to accommodate differentiated or segmented populations in which the 
likelihood of encounter is high within a subgroup and low between subgroups.  The transnational diffusion 
of ideas, practices and technologies involves segmented populations because national boundaries and 
cultural differences insert additional filters through which learning about new ideas, practices, or 
technologies must pass. 
 
Though national borders do not form as strong a barrier to communication as they did in the past, some 
countries still succeed in walling off their populations from global information flows.  North Korea is the most 
successful today, but most dictatorships limit local access to foreign-origin information.  To the extent that a 
                                                     
5 Liliana Goldin, “Work and ideology in the Maya highlands of Guatemala,” Economic Development and Cultural Change 41/#1: 
103-4 (Oct. 1992) notes such beliefs were common among Maya in Guatemala.  
 
6 E.g., M. Caswell and D. Zilberman, “The effects of well depth and land quality on the choice of irrigation and technology,” 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 68: 798-811 (1986) and G. Feder, R.E. Just, and D. Zilberman, “Adoption of 
agricultural innovations in developing countries: A survey,” Economic Development and Cultural Change 33: 255-298 (1985). 
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government can make national boundaries into barriers excluding communications from outside, they 
prevent learning about inventions and innovations and keep adoption decisions from arising at all.  Even 
when borders are permeable language differences channel the direction of information flows.  Translation 
can widen the flows, but it only occurs when someone (perhaps the originator of an idea or invention; 
perhaps an early adopter who wants to spread it) decides that a particular piece of information is important 
enough to justify the work involved.  The spread of English as a second language around the world has 
reduced some of the barriers between countries, though may accentuate the differences of information 
open to the more privileged and to the less privileged within countries because the former are much more 
likely to have opportunities to learn English. 
 
When communication succeeds, cross-national differences in adoption reflect different conjunctures of the 
same six factors that influence adoption in a single country. 
 
While the characteristics of the technology itself may remain constant, the comparisons to competing 
technologies can differ considerably because they depend on what else is available.  Where batteries are 
easily obtained, a wind-up flashlight will be a distant second choice after a battery-powered flashlight; 
households will not acquire them, or will only have them for emergencies in case all batteries on hand are 
run down.  Where batteries are scarce, a wind-up may be the only choice. 
 
The economic cost-benefit ratios of new technologies may be radically different in various places because 
of differences in physical environment, factor endowments, local operating skills, or cost of infrastructure 
and supplies needed to keep the technology running.  The economics of using solar cells are very different 
in the Sahara than in rainy Seattle or the dark Arctic winter.  A constant national labor shortage greatly 
reinforced 19th Americans’ efforts substitute machines for humans in as many areas of production and 
housework as possible; plentiful labor meant the need to invent or acquire labor-saving machinery was 
much lower in China or India.  Local skill levels can increase, and governments use policy devices like 
expedited residence permits for skilled immigrants, requirements that foreign firms allowed to operate in the 
country train locals for skilled jobs, or hiring foreign instructors to staff technical schools and colleges to 
increase the local skilled labor pool.  However, technology choices do depend on current and near-future 
skill attainments rather than long-term potentials.  Extending a national electric grid is much easier in 
countries where most people live in large cities and concentrated villages than in countries where most of 
the population is spread thinly across vast deserts, and absence of reliable electricity constrains many 
technology choices.  One can cook food in the Gobi Desert, but using an electric stove is usually not an 
option. 
 
Differences in the mode of social decision about adopting new technologies may or may not yield 
differences.  Advocates of participatory decision-making tend to assume that an open process leading to 
collective consensus decision will result in using technologies that are less centralizing and less risky than 
those chosen in either an elite-run decision processes or a system of individual choice (because the 
wealthiest will be able to operate at a scale overshadowing everyone else), but that is a proposition that 
needs further testing.  In a world of open communication, it may be harder for elites than for cohesive social 
groups to exclude unapproved technologies or unapproved uses of approved technologies.  In a cohesive 
social group, mutual regard and respect for the tradition of consensus provide effective barriers against 
individual technology wandering.  Elites may enjoy comparable legitimacy but when they do not they are 
likely to face the sorts of individual wandering in which Iranians put sermons and revolutionary messages 
Transnational Diffusion of Ideas and Technology 
 
 
  8
from Ayatollah Khomeini into their cassette recorders and residents of the Baltic republics connected to the 
Swedish cell phone system rather than use Soviet landlines. 
Differences in communication channels can have an impact.  Fewer mass media outlets that reach a 
smaller segment of the population appear by definition to be less effective at disseminating information 
about ideas, practices, and technologies.  Though paucity of mass media does not necessarily mean 
people cannot get information7 but informal oral networks are not the best ways to circulate detailed 
technical information.  Without ways to secure more detail, the discussions between users and family, 
friends, or occupational contacts that most influence adoption decisions may not be as effective. 
 
Social and material conditions in which the technology will be used have an impact, but many technologies 
can be used in under a variety of conditions.  Minnesotans need down parkas while Nigerian villagers do 
not; but both can wear tee shirts.  Some technologies are perceived as culturally relevant, and adopted or 
resisted on cultural grounds; others are perceived as culturally neutral.  Cassette tape recorders, initially 
developed with the idea that people would use them to have a portable source of musical entertainment, 
were quickly adopted by political dissidents ranging from Marxist guerillas to Islamicist imams for spreading 
their message. 
 
Culturally based reactions to foreign origin technologies depend very much on the extent of promotion by 
trusted persons.  Many studies of the cross-border spread of ideas and technologies acknowledge that their 
reception depends on their fit with already prevailing local models.  Those that can be presented as 
consistent with local norms are more likely to be accepted than those that cannot.  Colonial units in India 
willingly accepted new rifles in the 1850s since weapons are central to soldiering.  Suggestions that the 
grease on the cartridges that had to be bitten before loading them into the rifles came from pigs or cows 
fanned the preexisting discontent among some Moslem and Hindu soldiers into mutiny because the grease 
was now seen as violating religious dietary laws.  Even the name given to a device can affect the likelihood 
of adoption if locals interpret it in different ways.  The most famous commercial example is the marketing 
fiasco of Chevrolet’s attempts to sell its Nova model in Latin America.  Chevrolet had named it with the 
Latin word for “new,” but locals read the name as “no va” (“doesn’t go”) instead.  Community influentials 
who dislike a foreign idea, practice, or technological innovation can discourage adoption by castigating it as 
contrary to local morals, likely to destroy local ways, or creating unwanted dependence on outsiders.  
Those who like it can promote adoption through both talking about it and by using it; their words and deeds 
indicate how it can be incorporated into local culture without severe negative consequences.  People who 
are unhappy with local ways might even adopt a foreign idea, practice, or technological innovation as a way 
of expressing their unhappiness with and desire for change in the current situation. 
 
The strong differences of climate, topography, economic factor endowments, and cultural heritages 
between industrial and developing countries around the world have inspired concern that many countries, 
particularly smaller and poorer ones, end up with technology that fails to meet their real needs.  This is 
often attributed to the influence of multinational corporations, but there are actually three reasons why 
persons, groups, local business firms, or the government in a country acquire inappropriate technology:  
 
1.) the whole set of currently known and used technologies is inappropriate to a particular country 
or activity within it,  
                                                     
7 In many African countries the rumor flows known in francophone countries as radio trottoir (pavement radio) often make up for 
scanty broadcast media.  See Stephen Ellis, “Tuning in to pavement radio,” African Affairs 88 (#352): 321-330 (1989). 
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2.) inappropriate technology is acquired because no one in the country providing information to 
the choosers knows about the appropriate technologies that exist, or 
 
3.) the choosers know about appropriate technologies but choose inappropriate ones.8   
 
Since multinational corporations are not the only source of technology in the world, they are not solely 
responsible for instances of the first problem.  They could be the source of the second and third problems 
through selective presentation of information or hard bargaining, but as governments, locally owned firms, 
and others in developing countries acquire greater awareness of available technologies and greater ability 
to compare them knowledgeably the bargaining balance is shifting.  In the meantime a significant 
“appropriate technology” movement,9 given more impetus by rising concern for ecological sustainability, 
seeks to remedy all three problems through developing technologies designed specifically for conditions in 
poor countries, publicizing all technologies they regard as appropriate, and developing contacts with 
technology choosers.  
 
In cross-border as well as within country situations, the hazard model is a summary of patterns that result 
from the aggregate of technology choices.  In so doing, they obscure the activities of promoters and 
discouragers of new technologies, innovators, firms, governments, and others often seek to influence the 
cross-border spread of ideas and technologies.  Innovators generally want to see their innovations adopted 
widely.  Some business firms prosper by encouraging use; both cellphone network providers and cellphone 
manufacturers prosper when usage spreads.  Other firms prosper through patents and licensing; they want 
licensees but not unauthorized copiers.  Governments both encourage diffusion of particular technologies 
through their foreign aid programs or other subsidies, and constrain diffusion through export controls.  
Private “non-profits” (foundations, institutes, advocacy organizations) have been strong supporters of 
programs to develop and distribute higher-yielding varieties of plants commonly grown for food in 
developing areas; they also helped disseminate birth control drugs and devices.  Others have campaigned 
against the use of certain technologies, particularly the products of nuclear engineering, genetic 
modification, and animal cloning. 
 
 
<end> 
 
 
                                                     
8 Frances Stewart, Technology and Underdevelopment (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1977), page 3. 
 
9 Inspired initially by E.F. Schumacher, Small is Beautiful (New York: Harper and Row, 1973). 
 
